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EU Law in U.S. Legal Academia*
Daniela Carusot
The history of EU law in the ID. cunculum is a classical tale of ise and fail. An avantgarde, boutique offering m the 1970s, and a fairly popularcourse in the 1990s, today EU law n
US law schools is slowly losing promnence. his Article begins by tracking this parabolic
trajectory and argues that the discipline both rose and fell for contingentreasons that aremostly
unrelated to its pedagogical and analytical sigmilicance. The Article then provides a crtical
appraisalof what EU law is uniquely poised to offer both in the classroom and as a subject for
legal scholarship. An illustration based on French expedences of Europeanizationsupports the
clain that EU law as an autonomous subject, can still make an origmal and nonfungible
continbution to US legalacademia.
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INTRODUCTION

Within a symposium aimed at assessing the state of the European
Union (EU) two decades after the Treaty of Maastricht, I have been asked

to speak about the EU' as a player in a multipolar world. Let me narrow
*
Paper delivered in New Orleans, LA, on March 25, 2011, at the Tulane Journal of
International and Comparative Law Symposium "Twenty Years After Maastricht" for the panel:
The EU as a Player in a Multi-Polar World. Thanks to Francesca Bignami, GrAinne de Bfirca,
Lilian Faulhaber, Roger Goebel, Duncan Kennedy, and Fernanda Nicola for very helpful
comments. Errors are mine.
t
Q 2011 Daniela Caruso. Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
I.
The terms "EU" and "EU law" have been used properly only since 1993, the year in
which the Treaty Establishing the European Union came into force. Until then, the subject was
referred to as "European Community" (EC) or "European Economic Community" (EEC) law. In
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this broad topic down to the field of legal academia-a place where I can
speak from direct experience. My involvement with EU law began in
January 1993, exactly when the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force.
Since then, I have been teaching EU law in U.S. law schools (mostly at
Boston University) and have therefore joined the American academic
community of EU law specialists.2 Within this community, it goes
without saying that the EU is a significant enough player in the world to
deserve the attention of burgeoning lawyers outside of Europe; that its
law-a self-contained academic discipline-enjoys relative importance
vis-A-vis other subject matters; and that its legal analytical framework is a
proper subject of U.S.-based legal scholarship.
Such convictions are not to be espoused uncritically. The
competition for J.D. candidates' attention is today fiercer than ever.' In
light of the employment crunch and the financial crisis, legal education is
growing increasingly inward looking. Loading up on courses on the
domestic law of consumer protection and bankruptcy is intuitively more
likely to help our law students in their job searches than focusing on the
complexities of foreign legal systems. And even for those who take
international matters most to heart, EU law competes with much more
contemporary alternatives-most noticeably national security law, which
now has its own journals and more than one dedicated casebook.4 How
valuable a player is the EU, really, in a world where other economic and
political actors are emerging and posing their own complex and most
intriguing legal issues? It takes, after all, a good dose of chauvinism to
place additional emphasis on Western legal systems at a time when their
cultural hegemony is being rightly deconstructed!
Collectively, the twenty-seven EU members are the largest trade
partner of the United States and this might be, per se, a reason to focus
these pages, I occasionally take the liberty to superimpose the more contemporary EU label to all
the versions of the European legal integration project since 1950.
2.
See John C. Reitz, A Life in the CaRf of Comparative Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1453,
1453 (2002) ("[S]pecialists in the law of the European Union [are] a relatively small but steadily
growing group in the United States."); see alsoDavid Kennedy, Global Law and Governance (Fall
2010) (Course Description, Harvard Law School). The group now constitutes a discrete
"community of lawyers and jurists with a common vocabulary, a shared sense of history and a
shared range of professional activities," and calls therefore for self-reflection on intended and
unintended impact. Id
See, e.g., AcceleratedID (AJD), a Two-Year Program,Nw. LAw (2009), http://www.
3.
law.northwestern.edu/academics/ajd/documents/AJD.pdf (discussing reform of legal education,
shortening the JD, adding practical training).
See Scott L. Silliman, Teaching National Secuity Law, 1 J.NAT'L SEC. L. & Po'Y
4.
161, 161-68(2005).
Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Black Gaius: A Quest for the Multicultural Ongins of the
5.
"Western Legal Tradition," 51 HASTINGS L.J. 479, 549, 554-55 (1999-2000).
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on the EU while training to be a trade lawyer.' But when one breaks
down the statistics, it turns out that only Germany, the United Kingdom,
France, and (recently) the Netherlands make it to the top ten, and none of
them rivals China, Japan, Canada, or Mexico in terms of sheer volume of
trade and investment with the United States. Similar perplexities arise
when one considers the geopolitical status of the EU in foreign affairs:
how crucial a player is the EU, in fact, when every major world
conflict-most recently the North African uprisings-has its members
scattered across a broad spectrum of political and military postures?
Why make room for the EU, as such, and focus on its own specific legal
order both in the classroom and through research endeavors?
Based on this springboard of questions, my comments provide a
follow-up to a contribution authored by George Bermann for this very
Journal in 1995.

Bermann remarked then that little had been written

about "the nature of the interest in the European Community within the
American legal community,"' and began investigating why and "how the
U.S. legal conception of the Community ha[d] itself changed" in light of
Europe's legal transformation since the 1950s." The time is ripe, in my
view, for revisiting that investigation, bringing it up to date, and
pondering how EU law, as an autonomous discipline, can contribute to
the future of U.S. law schools both in the classroom and in research
workshops.
It is my impression that the trajectory of EU law in the J.D.
curriculum is parabolic in shape. Curricular offerings and levels of
enrollment in EU law classes, engagement of full-time faculty in the
teaching and research of EU law, and publication of EU-centered articles
in top law reviews, indicators of this trajectory, have not been the subject
of systemic empirical assessment. Nonetheless, the trajectory emerges
quite clearly from multiple examples, direct observation, and voxpopuli

6.
See United States (Bilateral Relations), EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/ (last updated July 13, 2011)
("The EU and the US enjoy the most integrated economic relationship in the world, illustrated by
unrivalled levels of mutual investment stocks, reaching over E2.1 trillion. Total US investment in
the EU is three times higher than in all of Asia and EU investment in the US is around eight times
the amount of EU investment in India and China together.").
7.
See Top Ten Countries with Which the US. Trades, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar.
2011), http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/2011/03/balance.html.
8.
George A. Bermann, European Community Law from a US. Perspective,4 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (1995).
9.
Id
10. Id.

TULANE I OFINT'L & COMP LAW

178

[Vol. 20

in relevant academic circles." An avant-garde, boutique offering in the
1970s, and a fairly popular course by the time of the Treaty of
Maastricht, EU law in U.S. law schools is now losing prominence. Each
stage of this trajectory raises obvious questions and prompts perhaps less
obvious answers. I will begin by recalling why the law of the European
Economic Community (EEC) (as it was known through the mid-1980s)
acquired the role of distinctive subject matter, detaching itself from more
comprehensive pedagogical units such as international or comparative
law. I will then track the rest of the trajectory until the present day,
discussing EU law's reasons for survival and perhaps growth in
contemporary U.S. legal academia. My coverage of relevant literature
will be painfully selective, but hopefully detailed enough to sketch
general trends. Borrowing Mark Tushnet's well-known taxonomy of
comparative law methodologies-functionalism, bricolage and
expressivisml 2-I will discuss, the prevalence of functionalist EU law
studies in the legal and cultural climate of the 1990s, the subsequent
marginalization of EU law to the rank of bricolage material, and the
residual role of expressivism in EU-U.S. comparative studies. I will then
argue that the comprehensive study of the legal order of the EU continues
to have much to offer in the J.D. classroom, and that the field-a
uniquely rich illustration of free trade's intended and unintended
consequences-is a prime location for global legal scholarship.
II.

THE BEGINNING

The beginning of EU law in the J.D. curriculum can be
conventionally identified in 1963, with the publication of the first
casebook on the subject by Eric Stein and Peter Hay at the University of
Michigan. 3 Born and educated in Czechoslovakia, Eric Stein left Europe
in the late 1930s, and by the 1950s was an established international
lawyer in the United States.14 His casebook warned international lawyers
that they might be ignoring the nascent European Communities at their

11. On March 26, 2010, Boston University School of Law hosted a one-day workshop on
"Teaching European Union Law Abroad" with the goal of facilitating self-reflection among EU
law instructors based predominantly in North-American law schools.
12. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilitiesof Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 108 YALE L.J.
1225, 1228 (1999).
13.
See CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE ATLANTIC AREA
(Eric Stein & Peter Hay eds., 1963); see also Joseph H.H. Weiler, Enc Stein--A Tnbute, 82
MICH.L.REv. 1160, 1161-62 (1984).

14.

William W Bishop, Jr., Enc Stein, 82 MicHi. L. REv 1157, 1157-59 (1984).
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own peril." Since 1957, Community institutions had steadily taken over
the negotiations on trade barriers within the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." The Commission had largely replaced the
Member States in matters of agricultural policy and manufacturing
standards. The practical impact of European legal integration on
transatlantic trade, together with the possibility that the six founding
states might coordinate security and defense matters with less U.S. input
than in the aftermath of World War H, was definitely cause for concern
and interest." Transactional lawyers had to reckon that the locus of trade
regulation was now Brussels." Politically, the Marshall Plan's vision of a
Western bulwark against Soviet expansion was yielding tangible results. 9
But there was more than transactional and geopolitical interest.
Stein has been credited with the early intuition that a seemingly anodyne
trade arrangement between six European states would later acquire
tremendous meaning for both law and world politics.20 An interesting
legal mutation was occurring-one that would finally free the continental
notion of sovereignty from its Westphalian straitjacket. The Community
was, in fact, a budding federation, more interesting in U.S. eyes than any
other existing federal model for a number of reasons: (1) the founding
states had a proven record of full sovereignty, not just of administrative
autonomy as in other decentralized systems; (2) the experiment of
integration could be watched live, in the making, rather than through
historical accounts; (3) the politics of integration were sufficiently
peculiar to the European context as to allow for a depoliticized revival of
classical debates. And so it happened: the curiosity of international
lawyers for the new European creature-one that started with a common
international treaty but that quickly evolved into a single and coherent
legal entity endowed with significant state-like features-merged with
the old obsession of U.S. constitutional lawyers with issues of
federalism. 21 Comparative law, as it had been known until then, was no
competition.22 EU law became the most interesting thing the Old
Continent had to offer.
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 2-3 (Eric Stein & Peter Hay eds.,
15.
1967).
at 2,5.
See id.
16.
17. Id.at 4.
Seeidat3,6.
18.
19. Id.at 1.
20. Stein "contributed to the particularization of Community law as a legal discipline."
Weiler, supra note 13, at 1161.
Bermann, supra note 8, at 5.
21.
22. Mathias Reimann, The ProgressandFailure of Comparative Law in the Second Half
of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 699 (2002) (remarking that since the
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The job market was, as always, implicated in this academic
development. The 1980s saw a rapid expansion of transatlantic law
practice.23 By 1985, London, Paris, and Brussels had become (with
Hong Kong) the most popular locations for overseas offices of U.S.based law firms.24 The progressive relaxation of regulatory barriers,
exemplified by Germany's 1989 reform, allowed for an additional
expansion of American law firm branches in Europe, opening up new
possibilities of Europe-based employment for U.S.-educated lawyers.25
Transatlantic legal practice seemed set to grow, and the practical
relevance of EU law for U.S. lawyers was spiking upwards. Law schools
adjusted their curricular offerings accordingly.26
By the same token, the space occupied by the Community in the
syllabi of international law and in the scholarly agendas of prominent
internationalists grew. The uniqueness of the European integration
project in the landscape of regional organizations was celebrated in two
main respects. First, this was no ordinary free trade agreement: the
predictable list of market freedoms (for goods, services, labor, and
capital) was accompanied by firmly regulated agricultural and industrial
policies and by an active antitrust branch. The seductively simple
promise of Ricardian prosperity, so often touted in multilateral fora, was
by no means the only ingredient in the EU recipe; the success of
European integration through law was therefore as much a triumph of
free trade as a manifesto on the limits of neoliberalism." A second
striking trait of European legal integration was the degree of states'
compliance with the rulings of the two supranational courts of the
continent: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR).2 3 To all those interested in testing the efficacy
of international law, this by and large successful experiment in judicial
supranationalism was as close as it got to the philosopher's stone.
establishment of the American Journal of Comparative Law in 1952, comparative law in the
United States had largely failed to establish itself as a "coherent enterprise" and that the
scholarship was still mostly "random, unconnected, and thus inconsequential").
23. Carole Silver, Globalization and the US Market in Legal Services-Shilbng
Identities, 31 LAW &PO'Y INT'L Bus. 1093,1111 (2000).
24. Carole Silver et al., Between Difllsion and Distnctiveness in Globalization: US.
Law Fims Go Glocal,22 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICs 1431, 1439 n.31 (2009); see also Carole Silver,
supranote 23, at 1108-11.
25. SYDNEY M. CONE, III, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN LEGAL SERVICES: REGULATION OF
LAWYERS AND FIRMS IN GLOBAL PRACTICE § 11.2 (1996).
26. I am indebted to Professor Roger Goebel for authoritatively corroborating this point.
27. See, e g., David Kennedy, Tuning to Market Democracy: A Tale of Two
Architectures,32 HARV INT'L L.J. 373, 379-85, 392, 394 (1991).
28. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication,107 YALE L.J. 273, 276, 296 (1997).
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III. SCHOLARLY ASCENDANCE
The further ascendance of EU law in U.S. legal scholarship-from
international lawyers' pet project to new fuel for comparative
constitutional scholarship, and then on to self-contained subject matter
with an independent raison d'etre-is somewhat counterintuitive and
bears recounting in some detail. Under the auspices of Eric Stein and
Peter Hay, EU law grew as a discipline at the University of Michigan,29
and the collaboration between U.S. legal academia and the European
University Institute (EUI) grew in quality and intensity. The year 1984
saw the coming to life of a massive research project sponsored by the
EUI and the Ford Foundation, named "Integration through Law.""o
According to the vision of senior coauthor Mauro Cappelletti, an
eminent Italian comparativist on the law faculties of both Florence and
Stanford, the project was to be generally one of comparative law,
mapping the budding European legal integration onto the lessons of a
mature American federalism." The parallelism between the American
past and the European present was (and remains) widely acknowledged
among U.S. constitutionalists.32 The blueprint of the project had a oneway direction, identifying the United States as a source of "experience"
and Europe as wide-eyed youth in need of inspiring examples. Through
the special lens of European integration, for once America could be seen
as the wise Old Continent.
"Integration through Law," however, was not solely Cappelletti's
brainchild. Another intellectual strand within the project was clearly
determined to avoid the trap of ephemeral similitude, and rather set out to
unearth the specific sociolegal dynamics that were allowing for Europe's
legal change.34 In this view famously heralded by Joseph Weiler,
29.
Miriam Aziz, E Stein Thoughts From a Bridge. A Retrospective of Writings on
New Europe and American Federalism, 20 Y.B. EUR. L. 573, 574 (2001) (book review)
("Michigan Law School [was] the first American law school to include a course on European
Community law.").
30.
INTEGRATION THROUGH LAw: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, at vi
(Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1985).
3 1. Id
32. "The (uncertain) transformation of a treaty into a constitution is at the center of the
European Union today; it was also at the center of the American experience between the
Revolution and the Civil War." Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism,83 VA. L.
REv. 771,776,791 (1997) (positing that the United States from the 1780s to the 1860s and the EU
since the 1950s are two historical examples of a federalist turn coinciding with a new political
beginning for a nation).
33.
OldAmerica v New Europe, ECONOMIST, Feb. 22, 2003, at 32.
34. See J.H.H. Weiler, Fedeaism Without Constitutionalism: Europek Sonderweg, in
THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE

EUROPEAN UNION 54 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).
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European legal integration had as much to teach as it had to learn."
Having taught EU law at Michigan from 1985 to 1992, Weiler gave the
discipline the hallmark of fame, first by penning the Trnsformation of
Europe for the Yale Law Journal, and then by taking his phenomenal
teaching to Harvard Law School." The Transformation avoided any
direct reference to U.S. federalism," but explained Europe in terms
remarkably intelligible to U.S. lawyers and in a compelling narrative
form." This was, simply enough, a constitutional project based on a
court-led centralization of state powers. Yet its internal analytics were
sufficiently rich and peculiar to dispel any off-putting d6ji vu effect. The
golden decade of EU law in U.S. law schools-the 1990s-had begun.
IV. THE REHNQUIST EFFECT
The U.S. Supreme Court was meanwhile unwittingly contributing to
the rise of EU law in the eyes of American lawyers.39 In his early years
on the Court, Justice Rehnquist had reminded his brethren that state
prerogatives were enshrined in the Constitution ("the Tenth
Amendment ... is not without significance"40 ) and had denounced the
undue growth of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. 4 in
his view, decades of Washington-friendly constitutional adjudication had
turned the doctrine of delegated powers into "fiction."42 Appointed to the
role of Chief Justice in 1985, Rehnquist spearheaded what we now know
as the "federalist revolution," openly aimed at restoring what he (and
many others) envisioned as the proper balance between state and federal
government in the U.S. constitutional design. Sandwiched between two
35. See id. at 57.
36. J.H.H. Weiler, Curriculum Vitae (2009), http://its.law.nyu.edu/faculty/profiles (search
"Weiler"; follow "J.H.H. Weiler" hyperlink; select "Full CV PDF").
37. That task was picked up by others. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Member State
Liabilityin Eurpe and the UnitedStates,4 INT'L . CONsT. L. 39, 39 (2006).
38. J.H.H. Weiler, The TransformationofEurope, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2405 (1991).
39. In 1995, George Bermann noted:
Questions of federalism, though never absent from the American constitutional scene,
have enjoyed a special prominence in the United States in very recent times, and seem
unlikely to lose that prominence in the near future. Even before the rise of the socalled 'new Republican majority' in Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court had evidenced
its intention to take federalism more seriously than it had become accustomed to taking
it in recent decades.
Bermann, supranote 8, at 5 (footnotes omitted).
40. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1976).
41.
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 308 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (tracing the expansion of Congress's powers in interstate commerce
back to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
42. Id.
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cases that upheld federal powers, Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan
43
TransitAuthoity(1985)
and Gonzales v Raich (2005)," were a number
of remarkable pronouncements aimed at keeping Congress's legislative
reach at bay. To name just a few: New York v United States (1992),45
upholding the state's challenge of federal legislation by breathing new
life into the Tenth Amendment; United States v Lopez (1995),46
narrowing the legislative reach of the interstate commerce clause; and
City of Boerne v Flores (1997),47 limiting Congress's enforcement
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Predictably, this flurry of dramatic pronouncements energized U.S.
legal academia. In polarized academic debates, federalism grew into a
sort of collective neurosis." It is in this context that EU law acquired its
highest degree of popularity ever. In January 1993, in sync with the
entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, a modem American
casebook on EU law came out of the presses of West Publishing.49 In
1994, the Columbia Law Review dedicated 125 pages to George
Bermann's discussion of "subsidiarity"so (a wholly European doctrine
aimed at determining, politically and perhaps judicially, the distribution
of powers between Brussels, states, and sub-state entities)," and in 1995,
the year of Lopez,52 Columbia University lent its flag to a new journal
devoted exclusively to European Law."
EU federalism was
43. 469 U.S. 528, 554-57 (1985).
44. 545 U.S. 1, 43 (2005), remanded 500 E3d 850 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The court upheld the federal power to prohibit medicinal use of cannabis, even when allowed by
state law. Id
45. 505 U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992) (holding that respecting the states' power as per the
Tenth Amendment was a matter of democracy despite New York's challenge to federal legislation
that required states either to acknowledge ownership of radioactive waste produced in their
territory, or to legislate for waste disposal according to predetermined federal standards); see also
George A. Bermann, Takng SubsidiaritySetiously: Fedealismin the European Community and
the UnitedStates,94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 423 (1994).
46. 514 U.S. 549, 566-68 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990
as lacking a sufficient nexus with the interstate clause).
47. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). The impact of this holding was amplified by other cases in
which the Court announced that the Fourteenth Amendment, while proper ground for federal
antidiscrimination statutes, did not always grant Congress the power to chastise states' sovereignty
by means of, e.g., damage actions. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
374 (2001).
48. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis,41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 908 (1994).
49. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW (1st
ed. 1993).
50. Bermann, suple note 45.
51.
Id.at 338-39.
52. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-68 (1995).
53. George A. Bermann, Forewordto 1 COLUM. J.EUR. L. 2405-06, 2409 (1994/95).
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mainstreamed into U.S. constitutional discourse. Top law journals made
room, without apologies, for EU law articles.54 EU law classes were
taught by full-time faculty members who considered the subject their
main area of research."
The European connection to the U.S. federalist debate was indeed
clear. The three main sources of the federalist revolution-the commerce
clause of the U.S. Constitution, the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and states' sovereign prerogatives per the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments"-found adequate functional equivalents in
the case law of the ECJ," which had meanwhile been busy
constitutionalizing the Union." In Luxembourg, the jargon was different,
and the interested American reader would have to decipher such alien
labels as "Cassis test"" and "Francovich liability."60 Besides, there was
something oddly "immature"' and even altogether "foolish"62 in certain
of those categories as treated by the ECJ. Nonetheless, the payoffs of
European investigations were appealing.
First, bringing the EU experience to bear in the American debate
had the effect of mixing up, and therefore diffusing, the political stakes
of the Supreme Court's case law. State prerogatives in the European
context of the mid-1990s were often associated with a bulwark of social
protection against the flood of neoliberal deregulation, brought about by
54. See, eg., Weiler, supra note 38; Bermann, supra note 45; Ernest A. Young, Protecting
Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American
Federalism,77 N.YU. L. REv 1612 (2002).
55. This line is based on personal experience and direct acquaintance with the EU law
community in the United States.
56. See Denis J. Edwards, FeaingFederalismk Failure: Subsidianty in the European
Union,44 Am. J. CoMp. L. 537, 563-64 (1996) (observing that the judicially sanctioned expansion
of federal powers in the United States has occurred through the interstate commerce clause, the
necessary and proper clause, the treaty power, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which served to
bind the states to the Bill of Rights).
57. See Ralf Michaels, The FunctionalMethod of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIvE LAW 339, 369-72 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann
eds., 2006). The traditional functionalist approach is as follows: "The comparatist [assumes] that
different societies face similar needs and that, to survive, any one society must have (functionally
equivalent) institutions that meet these needs." Id. at 369. Michaels also provides an extensive
account of the critique of this methodology. Id.at 369-72.
58. Weiler, supra note 38, at 2413, 2431, 2451.
59. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung flir Branntwein, 1979
E.C.R. 650, 660-61, 664-65.
60. Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5403,
1-5417-18.
Bermann, supra note 45, at 456 (portraying subsidiarity as a "crude" concept,
61.
symptom of the European system's "immaturity").
62. Id. at 452 ("In a seasoned federalism like that of the United States . .. the notion of
subsidiarity may . .. have a somewhat hollow, even foolish, ring to it.").

2011]

EULA WIN U S. LEGAL A CADEMIA

185

the judicial dismantlement of internal market barriers." This was enough
to cast state sovereignty in a different argumentative light. In the words
of Ernest Young: "Considering issues of federalism in the context of
Europe ... helps us shed some of the historical baggage hindering

present debate, and it demonstrates that any number of different federal
settlements may be workable and legitimate."" For those interested in
de-ideologizing and redoctrinalizing the federalism question, EU
parallels offered an extraordinary opportunity.
Second, the very effort of searching for functional equivalence in an
altogether different analytical system could prompt novel taxonomies and
lead to deeper insights." For instance, according to George Bermann,
"To discover whether subsidiarity ... plays a role in the conduct of U.S.

federalism, one has in any event to transcend labels and look for
equivalent thinking under any other name by which it might pass."66
Further, "The comparison, .. . in the process, may allow us to better

understand [the nature of] U.S. federalism."0
The EU could certainly "learn lessons"" or internalize the
"cautionary tales'"' that came from the United States. But the very
existence of this parallel, sufficiently complicated experimentation with
federalism across the Atlantic had indeed something to offer in return.
This wave of academic Europhilia permeated the U.S. judiciary. Justice
Breyer's dissent in Prhitz v United States referred to the EU edifice in
order to relativize the anticommandeering principle."o This was by no
means the first" or the last72 reference to European law in the Supreme
63. See FRITZ W SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 26-28,
38-42, 58-61 (1999).
64. Young, supranote 54, at 1618 (footnote omitted).
65. See Tushnet, supm note 12, at 1228 ("Functionalism claims that particular
constitutional provisions create arrangements that serve particular functions in a system of
governance. Comparative constitutional study can help identify those functions and show how
different constitutional provisions serve the same function in different constitutional systems. It
might then be possible to consider whether the U.S. constitutional system could use a mechanism
developed elsewhere to perform a specific function, to improve the way in which that function is
performed here." (footnote omitted)).
66. Bermann, supra note 45, at 406.
67. Id.at 448-49.
68. Edwards, supranote 56, at 563.
69. Young, supranote 54, at 1614-18.
70. 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer's foray into EU territory
was promptly reprimanded by Justice Scalia. See id. at 921 n.11 ("I[Clomparative analysis [is]
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to
the task of writing one.").
71.
See, e.g., Alain A. Levasseur, The Use ofComparativeLaw by Courts,In THE USE OF
COMPARATiVE LAW BY COURTS 315, 325-28 (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp eds., 1999)
(illustrating the use of comparative law by the U.S. Supreme Court through 1995).
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Court of the United States (Supreme Court), but it was by far the most
structural. At stake was not just the possibility of transatlantic
similarities between discrete rules, but rather a comprehensive overlap of
two legal archetypes of federalism." There was more, here, than the
academic discipline of comparative law had ever promised.74 For once,
the legal orders of the old and new continent seemed to have reached
sufficient structural convergence that dialogue could actually become
relevant for the positivists."

V.

THE MYTH OF CONVERGENCE

Unsurprisingly, the context for this unprecedented degree of U.S.
interest in the legal structure of European federalism was larger than law.
It asserted itself in the way of a fad, by operating in conjunction with
other sociocultural phenomena. The 1990s, the golden age of EU law in
American academia, were also years of unprecedented optimism among
internationalists. The end of the Cold War and the spread of the
"Washington consensus" among international financial institutions led
the world to the impression that international values might at last be
converging.76 This "long decade," which by Nathaniel Berman's timeline
"began with '1989' and ended somewhere between '9/11' and the US

72. See, eg, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316-17 n.21 (2002); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005); see also Donald
E. Childress 1II, Using Comparative ConstitutionalLaw To Resolve Domestic FederalQuestions,
53 DuKE L.J. 193, 198 (2003) (positing that the time may be ripe for an increase in the use of
comparative constitutional analyses).
73. Gerald L. Neuman, Subsicharnt Harmonization,andThen- Values: Convergence and
Divergence in Europe and the UnitedStates, 2 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 573, 574-75 (1996); Patrick R.
Hugg, Tansnational Convergence: European Union and Amrencan Fedemlism, 32 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 43, 102-05 (1998).
74. Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 143, 144 (Keith Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen &

Gregory Caldeira eds., 2008). Contrasting the disciplines of political science and law as applied
to judicially umpired federalism, Daniel Halberstam has poignantly noted law's traditional
indifference to comparative observations: "Normative constitutional scholarship has ... shunned
comparative inquiry. After all, why look abroad, when the normative framework of the inquiry is
rooted at home?" Id
75. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, OfPower and Responsibihty: The PoliticalMorality of
Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REv. 731, 732 (2004).
76. John Williamson, Democracy and the "Washington Consensus," 21 WORLD DEV.
1329, 1329-33 (1993) (coining the expression "Washington consensus" to designate the lowest
common denominator of policy advice given to Latin American countries as of 1989: fiscal
discipline, liberalization of interest rates, trade, and foreign direct investment, privatization,
deregulation, secure property rights, and also a redirection of public expenditure priorities toward
fields offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution).
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invasion of Iraq,"" nurtured the "ideal of the gradual transformation of
the world into a community governed by widely-accepted internationalist
principles and institutions."" Of course, reality was more complicated,
but convergence made for fashionable discourse, which recast outrageous
events as unavoidable deviations from a trajectory of steady progress."
To this powerful (and critical) account of the "long decade," one may add
that in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the French newspaper Le
Monde proclaimed unambiguous transatlantic alliance in a famous
editorial ("Nous sommes tous Ambricains")" and that three months later,
the European Council issued the Laeken Declaration (the blueprint of a
Philadelphia-inspired constitutional moment for the EU). These were
also years of consolidation of the EU's eastward expansion, arguably
attesting to the demise of once insurmountable ideological divisions.82
This cultural climate enabled an unprecedented rapprochement between
mainstream constitutionalists and comparative lawyers.
To be sure, since its very inception, European legal integration lent
a tremendous boost to the discipline of comparative law, both within
Europe and abroad. Inside the Old Continent, comparative law had been
truly instrumental to the creation of the integration project. In its early
years, the ECJ drew extensively from the laws of the founding states to
develop a coherent and palatable legal order of its own, and in so doing,
it energized Member States' public law comparativists." In the 1980s,
the incipient efforts to harmonize the laws of torts and contracts
intensified the cross-border dialogue among domestic civilistes and gave
new meaning to the then peripheral discipline of comparative private

law.84

77. Nathaniel Berman, Intervention in a 'Divided World': Axes ofLegitimacy, 17 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 743, 744 (2006).
78.
Id.at 745.
79. Id. at 745-46, 750-53 (noting that the decade was also marked by the genocides of
Rwanda and Srebrenica).
80. Jean-Marie Colombani, Nous sommes tousAmricains, LE MONDE (Paris), Sept. 13,
2001, translatedinWORLD PRESS, Nov. 2001, at 4-5.
81.
Charlemagne, Philadelphia or Frankfiurt. ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2003, at 52 ("No
meeting of the European Union's constitutional convention in Brussels is complete without a
reference to 'Philadelphia."').
Cf JAN ZIELONKA, EUROPE AS EMPIRE: THE NATURE OF THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN
82.
UNION 65, 82-83 (2006) (offering a less glorif-ying picture of eastern enlargement).
83. Francesca Bignami, Comparative Law and the Rise of the European Court of Justice
(Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
84. See Christian Joerges, The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation
Process and as a Contest of Disciplines-anAnalysis of the Directive on Unfair Terms in
ConsumerContracts,3 EUR. REv PRiv. L. 175, 184-88 (1995).
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On the other side of the Atlantic, scholarly interest in civil codes,
procedures, and constitutions of individual Member States, especially
Germany and France, had been steady-if marginal-for a long time."
But the scholarly ascendance of EU constitutional federalism in the
1990s gave comparative constitutional law an altogether new role. As
illustrated by George Bermann's work on subsidiarity, the dominant
methodology for U.S.-EU comparisons in the 1990s became
functionalism." The functionalist premise was that the project of EU
legal integration, as interpreted by the Union's centralized judiciary, had
much of the same purpose as the Supreme Court's doctrinal apparatus."
Europe seemed to be doing federalism by other means, i.e., by other
doctrines and, more importantly, by other politics, but doing federalism
nonetheless. The effort of deciphering its language was worthwhile,
because it yielded fresh evidence of good or bad practices that could
somehow enrich the federalist debate at home.
VI. THE END OF THE LONG DECADE AND THE ONSET OF BRICOLAGE
By definition, fads are transient and fall victim to shifts in
sociocultural perceptions. The myth of the long decade soon crumbled,
shattered as it was by the splintering of EU members on Iraqi matters,"
the imploding of the EU constitutional dream,98 and the bursting of many
a financial bubble. The world found itself divided again, with no
consensus on how to handle the economic interdependence of the
developed and developing worlds or how to inch towards stable peace."
At the level of transatlantic relations, the EU's statement of friendship in
the aftermath of 9/11 proved mostly meaningless, as the United States
found itself negotiating its European allegiances one state at a time in

85. See Mathias Reimann, The Progressand Failureof ComparativeLaw in the Second
Halfofthe Twentieth Centuy,50 AM. J.COM. L. 671, 671-74 (2002).
86. See Bermann, supra note 45.
87. See Michaels, supranote 57, at 341-42.
88. See, e.g., Fernanda Nicola & Fabio Marchetti, Constitudonahzing Tobacco: The
Ambivalence ofEuropeanFederalism,46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 507, 507-09 (2005).
iling Dreams of a Unired
89. Raj S. Chari & Francesco Cavatorta, The Iaq War
EU., 3 EuR. POL. Sci. 25 (2003).
90.
See JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBoN TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIs 2325 (2010).
91.
See Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development Second-Generation
Reforms andthe Incorporationof the Social,m THE NEW LAW AND EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 203, 203, 208, 228 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006)
(discussing the attempt at reconciling divergent development policies after the demise of the
Washington consensus).
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Kissingerian mode.92 And when the statement of friendship was not
meaningless, the EU's pledge of allegiance became politically
burdensome, in so far as it deepened the perceived hiatus between the
post-colonial Western powers and the rest of the globe."
On point of federalism, the EU's inability to produce a veritable
constitution took care of all ephemeral analogies for good. Alternative
narratives of the integration project, emphasizing its administrative and
regulatory core, as opposed to its constitutional and federalist traits,
gained scholarly currency.94 U.S. constitutional law scholars gradually
abandoned the field, and so did mainstream law journals. Income Tax
Discnmination and the PoliticalandEconoic Integration ofEurope,by
Michael Graetz and Alvin Warren," is to my knowledge the last EUfocused contribution to be published in a flagship journal of a top law
school. EU law courses have shrunk in enrollment and can be taught by
European visitors or simply outsourced to overseas campuses in the
summer. The European job market has become less promising to J.D.
students due to an inward-looking transformation of multinational firms,
now increasingly prone to staff their European offices with local lawyers
only briefly trained in the United States."
To be sure, this is not the end of U.S.-based interest in the European
federalist experiment. EU law as an autonomous legal system with
quasi-federal features, as outlined in Weiler's Transfornatiolfand since
complicated by further layers of law, politics and history, is still the
subject of many monographs, specialized law journal articles, and most
importantly, political science literature." In legal academia, however, the
comprehensive study of the dynamics of European integration has
migrated back to the fields it came from: comparative or international
law. For the positivist mainstream of scholars and teachers, a shift has
occurred. Within comparative law, the large-scale functionalism of the
Steven R. Weisman, Europe UnitedIs Good Isn't It, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at
92.
Cl (recalling Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's complaint that there was no single telephone
number that he could dial when he needed to speak to Europe).
93. Symposium, The Wst and the Rest in Compaative Law, 2008 Annual Meeting of
the American Society of Comparative Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law
(Oct. 2-4, 2008).
See generallyPETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCLiNG EUROPE
94.
AND THE NATION-STATE (2010).
95. Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrkmnationand the Political
andEconomic IntegrationofEurope, 115 YALE L.J. 1186 (2006).
96. Silver et al., supma note 24, at 1449.
97. See Weiler, supranote 38.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND
98. R. DANIEL KELEMAN, EUROLEGALISM:
REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 8-11 (2011).
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1990s has dried up, and bricolage (a term aptly chosen by Mark Tushnet
to indicate the scholarly technique of taking bits and pieces of a foreign
system as tools for domestic legal inquiries) is now the trend."
Indeed, the "long decade" of EU law's fame as an autonomous
discipline has left us with fantastic bricolage material. Once buried in
foreign law libraries, EU legal scholarship has now become abundantly
accessible due to the online availability of copious American writings on
the subject. The result is that, while the European project of legal
integration is, as a whole, less fashionable than it used to be, there is now
a vast amount of information on what the EU does, written and circulated
in U.S.-friendly language. A glance at major law reviews in the past few
years reveals a multitude of articles whose authors have no sustained
interest in the internal vicissitudes of the EU as an autonomous legal
system, but care very much about discrete features of that system that are
convenient terms of comparison, or units of measure, for U.S.-based or
international legal phenomena.
A taste of this type of literature can be savored through such pieces
as Beyond Regional Government by Gerald Frug.'" The author focuses
exclusively on spotting innovative techniques in the EU landscape.o' His
lack of interest for the intricate patterns of European legal integration
could not be any clearer:
I intend simply to rip from their European context specific institutional
ideas that might help us reconceptualize the relationship between local
separateness and regional togetherness in the United States. I shall leave
unexamined most of the institutional structure of the European Union. I
will focus instead solely on three specific aspects of the European Union
that, once appropriately revised, suggest organizational possibilities for a
regional legislature in the United States . . 102
This genre of legal scholarship would not have been possible
without the "long decade" experience. But it is also an unmistakable
sign of the end of that era: EU law is now useful if disaggregated into
single components, to be reassembled in new combinations for American
The functionalist mode of mid-1990s comparisons,
consumption.'
99. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 1229. To be sure, bricoleurs may also focus on functional
equivalence, but they remain radically indifferent to the big picture of the relevant legal systems
and have no interest in figuring out their general operating logic.
100. Gerald E. Frug, BeyondRegional Governnen; 115 HARv. L. REv. 1763 (2002).
101. Id.at 1794.
10 2. Id
103. See, eg., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark 1 Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
CorporateOwnership and Governance,52 STAN. L. REv. 127,133, 165-66,170 (1999) (looking at
Europe as an illustration of resilience of corporate governance rules in the face of competitive
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exemplified by Bermann's search for functional equivalents of
subsidiarity in the U.S. legal system, has given way to a looser,
decontextualized borrowing of occasionally interesting factoids or
ideas." Borrowings may range and have ranged widely, from EU-based
approaches to corporate governance'05 to antidiscrimination laws, or from
financial regulation to protection of privacy, but they all involve
"ripping" the subject of interest from its analytical context.
The point is worth stressing, because it bears directly on the "nature
of the interest" in EU law in contemporary U.S. academia. Once
similarities and the possibility for functional analogies have been
dismantled, all we are left with is attic material: random tools and toys
that may help U.S. lawyers play their game better and more elegantly.
There is no need to learn about the game those toys were originally
conceived for. If that is the case, EU law will remain in the attic of U.S.
something to explore during summers or free
legal education:
semesters-a cluster of discrete topics we can happily ask others about,
should curiosity arise.'06 Instead, a typical EU law course is, by
definition, comprehensive and systemic: it starts with history and
institutions, recounts the growth of human rights jurisprudence and other
constitutionalizing doctrines in the ECJ, continues with an analysis of the
internal market (freedoms and citizenship), and gives students a taste of
competition law and foreign relations.' The whole point of the course,
from both the teacher and scholar's perspective, is to lay out a self-

pressure); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End ofHistory for CorporateLaw, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439, 449-51, 454-55 (2001) (arguing, by contrast, that regimes are converging);
Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J. 1725, 1728-30 (2006)
(looking at recent changes in EU corporate law as manifestations of regulatory competition).
104. Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and
InternationalRegulation,59 AM. J.COMp. L. 1, 4 (2011).
105. Id.at 3-4.
106. Law and economics scholars have long taught us that European law is great material
for thought experiments, and many such experiments are now enabled by the EU's additional
layer of complexity. See, e.g., PAUL B. STEPHAN, FRANCESCO PARISI & BEN DEPOORTER, PrefaCe
toTHE LAW AND ECONOMICS OFTHE EUROPEAN UNION (2003).

107. Jean Monnet Program-The Law of the European Union, JEAN MONNET CTR. FOR
INT'L & REG'L ECON. LAW & JUSTICE-N.YU. SCH. OF LAw, http://centers.law.nyu.edu/
jeanmonnet/ (last updated May 27, 2011). The Web site describes the course on EU Law as:
[A] general introduction to the legal system of the European Union covering both its
constitutional and institutional architecture and focusing on a selection of substantive
law issues. .. . The materials follow three basic themes. 1) The Constitutional and
Institutional Setting of the Union and its Evolution. 2) Select Issues of Intra-Union
Trade in Goods and Services. 3) Select Issues of International Trade with Europe.
Id.
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contained legal order, with its own internal viewpoint' 8 and specific
analytical grids. Are there reasons, today, for keeping such a course
alive?

VII.

BEYOND BRICOLAGE

Interest remains high in the way Europeans make law, perform
judicial review, design taxation, handle migration, protect rights, or
invent mechanisms of social protection that bypass the concept of rights
altogether. Centers of European studies still thrive in the United States.'09
Departments of government, international relations, and political science,
still keen on Europe as a locus of democratic experimentation," continue
to invest resources in the study of EU and Member States' legal and
political structures. Dusk has not fallen on that front, and legal scholars
with interdisciplinary stakes in such departments continue to bask in
sunlight. Inside U.S. law schools, however, from the viewpoint of both
students and faculty, EU law has rather receded into a corner of
comparative law, where it mostly provides bricolage material and
competes for attention with other national or regional legal orders.
Competition stems, too, from inside the EU's own borders: the resilient
individuality of each Member State's legal system is still rich material for
expressivist comparative law research, so much so that the payoff of
studying, say, the laws of France, Germany,"' or Romania"2 rather than
the technicalities of the EU legal order may seem overall higher. It is
against this backdrop that a case for keeping a traditional (introductory
and comprehensive) course in EU law must be made. And the case can
be made, in my opinion, on grounds that I shall elliptically label as
108. On the "internal viewpoint" (in H.L.A. Hart's terms) of EU law, see Bignami, supra
note 83.
109. The list of European Studies Centers hosted by U.S. universities keeps growing. See,
eg., IU CenterReceives Grantfrom European Commission To Promote Better Understandhngof
the EU, IND. UNIv, http://newsinfo.iu.edu/news/page/normal/16902.html (last visited May 20,
2011) ("As a result of a $130,000 grant from the European Commission, an Indiana University
research center is embarking on a wide range of outreach activities to help business people,
government officials and others in the Midwest better understand the European Union and why it
should matter to them.").
110. See LAW AND NEw GOVERNANCE INTHE EU AND THE US 1-2 (Gniinne de Birca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2006); EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE INTHE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS A

NEw ARCHITECTURE 1-2, 9 (Charles E Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2010); see also Katerina
Linos, Diffusion Through Democracy,55 AM. J.POL. Sci. 678,678-86 (2011).

Q.

WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:
111. See, e.g., JAMES
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 5 (2003).

CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE

112. Steven Becker & Enikb Damaschin, A Comparative Study on the Pnciple [sic] of
Celeity in Romania and the United States ofAmerica, 16 LEX ET SCIENTIA INT'L J. 90, 90-91,

101 (2009).
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Technique, Foregrounding, and Globalzation. Here is a brief
explanation of such grounds, followed by an illustration.
A.

Technique

This is conceptually the least interesting part of the argument, and
one that only pertains to the subgroup of students already invested in
continental matters, but it is also the level where the comparative
advantage of EU law over discrete courses in the law of Member State
systems is most obvious. The regulatory apparatus superimposed by the
EU upon States' legal orders is here to stay.113 With it come a number of
notions that the prospective trade lawyer, antitrust litigator, or human
rights advocate needs to know in addition to the mind-numbing details of
municipal law. Given the massive amount of technique needed to
perform transatlantic legal work, the learning pace in the classroom
needs to be fast and effective. EU law provides instructors with a
particularly efficient pedagogical standpoint. The EU-driven pressure
toward harmonizing state laws, dismantling regulatory barriers, and
revisiting domestic hierarchies of sources brings to light the States'
points of legal resistance, making their institutional architectures more
transparent and their internal logic more intelligible."' The EU'S
emphasis on case law-still unparalleled in continental state systemsfalls on receptive ears in J.D. classrooms and adds dynamic depth to
otherwise flat, pre-realist materials on state law.
B. Foregrounding
The world is full of regional integration projects, all in the process
of equipping themselves with legal norms and theoretical frameworks."'
But the project of European integration is, by size and legal maturity,
somewhat ahead of the game and has already amassed its own share of
cautionary tales. Others involved in similar enterprises all over the globe
will find a very advanced experiment in liberalized trade in the study of
EU law. Classroom coverage of the progressive harmonization of the
internal EU market begins with treaty provisions that are as simple as
113. R. Daniel Kelemen, The Durability of EU Federalism (Mar. 20, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.ces.ufl.edu/files/pdf/JMCE/workshops/2010/DurabilityOPEUFederalism
032010.pdf.
114. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW
273-90 (3d ed. 2011) (noting the reaction of Member States to the ECJ's pronouncement of EU
law supremacy).
115. See Laura Spitz, The Evolving Architecture of North American Integration, 80 U.
COLO. L. REv. 735, 735-36 (2009).
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those found in 1947 GATT's text, which outlaw all barriers to trade in
goods."' By the end of the trade-in-goods discussion, however, EU law
students acquire sophisticated and contextualized awareness of the
massive legal, political, and sociological reverberations of free trade. The
internal market is a perfect laboratory for observing the dynamics of
such fields as taxation, intellectual property, and firm organization under
pressure of supranational regulation. The interdependence of foreign
trade policy with municipal regulatory matters, individual rights, and
redistributive policies remains generally opaque in the fragmented
teaching of U.S. law and somehow obscure even in world trade courses,
but it easily leaps to the front and center of an EU law classroom. More
generally, the course is a rare opportunity to see how, in law as in life, all
things are connected.
C

Globalization

This is the most theoretical upshot of EU law studies, if by legal
theory of globalization we mean the attempt to figure out where the
world is going through the lens of the law. To a great extent the EU has
transformed the relative role of law, politics, and grassroots regulation in
governance."' The reforms imposed from Luxembourg or Brussels force
national legislators to recalibrate the weight of executives, judiciaries,
and regulatory bodies. The loci of rulemaking are shifting, driven as they
are by supranational forces. The very concept of adjudication is being
affected by the institutional need to centralize highly consequential
Scholars of
decisions in the hands of a supranational court."'
with such
wrestle
must
jurisprudence or democratic constitutionalism
changes when mapping the global transformation of law as a concept.
The EU's push towards legal integration is forcing Member States
to revisit their history, their postcolonial arrangements, and their
philosophy of citizenship and inclusion. In so many parts of the world,
the ongoing quest for regime stability, economic recovery, and
constitutional solutions is profoundly impacted by choices made at the
EU level on matters of immigration, development policies, human rights
116. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
arts. 28, 34, 110 Mar. 30, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 59, 61, 93 [hereinafter TFEU].
117. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizationsof Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000,
M THE NEw LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19, 71 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds.,

2006) ("[I]n contemporary legal consciousness the question is the relationship between law and
politics.").
118. Id. (discussing the centrality of the judge in contemporary legal theory across the
globe).
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advocacy, and trade regulation."' EU-led changes cast long shadows on
the rest of the world and affect the global flow of wealth and people.
Basic EU law knowledge enables much global law learning.
The following illustration, based on a recent ECJ decision that lends
itself nicely to classroom discussion, is meant to give practical meaning
to the three points outlined supra Subparts A-C.
VI. MELKIAND THE PLIGHT OF THE ALGERIANS 2 0

A veritable tour de force through the French legal order, the case of
Mr. Melki et al., was decided by the ECJ in June 2010 upon preliminary
reference from the Cour de Cassation. Mella takes the classroom to the
north of France, where Algerian citizens were caught without proper
immigration documents and arrested. 2' This would have been a purely
French matter were it not for the fact that the arrest took place less than
twenty kilometers from the Belgian border.122 From the viewpoint of a
Union that aims at abolishing its internal frontiers, police checks
performed in the proximity of interstate borders are problematic. The
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits
border checks as a matter of principle,' and the Schengen Borders Code
allows police controls near internal borders to be performed only with
caution and safeguards.124 The Algerian citizens in question argued that
the French police had breached EU law given the location and
circumstances of the arrest,12 and their argument ultimately prevailed
before the ECJ.'26 As applied, the French statute authorizing police
controls produced effects equivalent to illegal border checks.127 The Cour

119. SeemfraPartVIII.
120. See Joined Cases C-1 88/10 & C-1 89/10, In re Melki, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
666 (June 22, 2010).
121. Id.para. 16.
122. Id.
123. TFEU art. 67. On this point, Melki's argument met with the Commission's approval.
See Melk, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS para. 62.
124. See Regulation 562/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
March 2006 Establishing a Community Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons
Across Borders (Schengen Borders Code), arts. 20, 21(a), 21(c), 2006 O.J. (L 105) 1, 11-12.
Schengen is the town where, in 1985, five of the Member States signed a treaty aimed at
abolishing border controls for persons. That treaty has grown into a series of EU rules,
consolidated in 2006. "Schengen" is now Euro-jargon for EU policies on frontier checks.
125. Melk, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS para. 19.
126. Id.para. 76.
127. Id para. 73. The ECJ found that a section of article 78-2 of the Code deprocddure
pdnale conflicted with the Schengen Borders Code due to the lack of requirement of "behaviour
... and of specific circumstances giving rise to a risk of breach of public order." Id.
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de Cassation dutifully noted the ECJ's answer and has since affirmed the
resulting liberty of other foreigners in subsequent cases.128
The pattern of the story is deceivingly simple. On the surface, this is
an individual invocation of EU free-movement rights for the purpose of
curbing the police powers of a Member State.'29 But the legal strategy of
the defendants is peculiar and worth noting. The issue might have been
framed as one of direct conflict between state criminal procedures and
EU law, without any nexus with French constitutional provisions. But
Melki et al. had in mind a different itinerary: they would have liked the
case to be heard by the Conseil Constitutionnel, which was recently
endowed with new powers of judicial review by way of constitutional
amendment,'o because they expected the Conseil itself to declare the
French statute void.' Many reasons of procedural expedience may have
prompted this lawyerly plot. It is plausible to assume, however, that the
following thoughts were looming on the mind of the defense counsel. As
a practical matter, assuming success on the merits, a pronouncement of
the Conseil Constitutionnel would have immediately outlawed all
comparable border checks with erga omnes effect.'32 At a loftier level, it
might have been preferable for the defendants and their fellow citizens
that justice be done in Paris by the Conseil Constitutionnel itself, a
national bulwark of legality. This path would have had the advantage of
avoiding a practical and symbolic triangulation with Luxembourg. The
issue of undocumented migration would have landed directly in the legal

128. Cour de Cassation [Cass] [Supreme Court for judicial matters] le civ., Feb. 23, 2011,
Bull. Civ. I,No. 09-72.420 (Fr.).
129. See, eg., Case C-60/00, Carpenter v. Sec. of State, 2002 E.C.R. 1-6305, paras. 31,42.
130. Loi organique 2009-1523 du 10 d6cembre 2009 relative Al'application de l'article 611 de la Constitution [Organic Law 2009-1523 of December 10, 2009, Relative to the Application
of Article 61-1 of the Constitution], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANrAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETrE OF FRANCE], Dec. 11, 2009, P 21379 (inserting a new Chapter Ha, entitled
'Priority Questions on Constitutionality,' into Title II of Order No 58/1067 of 7 November 1958
on the organic law governing the Conseil Constitutionnel). After this reform, ex-post judicial
review by the Conseil Constitutionnel can happen upon referral from the Conseil d'Etat or from
the Cour de Cassation. Id.
131. Id § 28.3 (providing for judicial review concerning the consistency of given
legislative provisions not only with "the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution" but
also with "France's international commitments").
132. Melk, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS para. 36 ("[R]eferral to the Conseil constitutionnel has the advantage that the Conseil can repeal a law which is incompatible with the
Constitution, and that repeal then has an effect erga omnes. By contrast, the effects ofajudgment
of an ordinary or administrative court, which finds that a national provision is incompatible with
EU law, are limited to the specific case decided by that court.").
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and political arena of the French republic, where the larger plight of
Algerians could be tackled holistically and systemically.'
The alternative path chosen by the Cour de Cassation (who
immediately asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling) was arguably the
correct way to proceed, and it proved ultimately successful for the
defendants. From Melki's viewpoint, however, it may have been suboptimal, due both to the loss of immediate erga omnes effects and to the
failure to involve the highest constitutional organ in Paris. In class, the
discussion of Mello requires comparing the two procedural paths and
unearthing the incentives of institutions and individuals involved. Melki
illustrates, in my opinion, the pedagogical and analytical effectiveness of
the EU law course.
In terms of technique, the payoffs are clear. Melka leads the class
nicely through the maze of French judicial institutions and highlights the
absolute novelty of ex-post judicial review in the French system. The
recent introduction of judicial review stands in contrast with
Montesquieu's characterization of the judge as the mouthpiece of the law,
and it revisits the traditional notion of exdgdse as well.'34 In this respect,
Melki is a perfect complement to cases usually covered earlier in the
course, which dwell on the French resistance to civil code amendments
imposed by an EU-wide products liability reform.' Thanks to those
cases, students already know that the myth of judicial subservience to
legislative sovereignty can paradoxically enable courts' discretion,' and
that continental civil codes may be about both corrective and distributive
justice.' The result is a problematized and intriguing introduction to
133. In matters of immigration, the powers of the EU are still very limited. Grant or denial
of citizenship, and ultimate decision to deport, are left in the hands of Member States. See
Francesca Strumia, Citizenship and Free Movement: European and American Features of a
JudicialFormula for IncreasedComity, 12 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 713, 714, 724 (2006).
134. The term "ex6ghse" stands for the proposition that courts are only faithful appliers of
laws and cannot, by definition, review the legality of legislative commands. This proposition is
conventionally attributed to nineteenth-century continental jurists. See, e.g., Mario Ascheri, A
Twmng Pointin the Civil-Law Tadition: From lus Commune to Code Napoleon, 70 TUL. L. REV.
1041, 1042-44 (1996).
135. Council Directive 85/374, arts. 1-3, 10, 22, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 30-31, 33. France
was repeatedly brought before the ECJ for failure to transpose the product liability directive into
French law. See Case C-52/00, Comm'n v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3856, 1-3876-77; Case C177/04, Comm'n v. France, 2006 E.C.R. 1-2479,1-2504.
136. MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 56-60, 252-55 (2004).

137. See Daniela Caruso, The Afissing View ofthe Cathedra: The Pnvate LawPadigm
of the European Legal Integration, 3 EuR. L.J. 3, 14-17 (1997). This article discusses the
implementation of the 1985 EC Products Liability Directive in France, which required amending
the French civil code. This meant making explicit the proconsumer approach of the French civil
courts enabled for decades by the code's elliptic provisions and by the traditional opacity of
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separation of powers A4la franpaise-anarchetype in constitutional theory
across the world.
The foregrounding effect is equally intense. Melld is part of the
discussion of free movement of persons, which comes on the heels of
free movement of goods and is closely patterned upon the early ECJ
pronouncements on interstate trade obstacles. Border police controls on
persons are eerily reminiscent of quality or health controls upon exports
and fall into a known groove of regulatory barriers of which the EU
presumptively disapproves. Conceptually, the case is about a paradigm
initially conceived for 'things' and soon enough applied to crucial
dimensions of the human condition (freedom, citizenship, postcolonialism). It is a window into the far-reaching consequences of even
the most unassuming trade agreement, and the unavoidable political
spillover of market integration.
In terms of globalization, Melk introduces the class to the EU's role
in postcolonial mediation. The massive Algerian presence in France is
no longer a matter reserved to national sovereignty and can no longer be
contained within the borders of French republicanism.'3 8 While France
can still control migration flows by means of citizenship rules,'" the EU
necessarily complicates the French-Algerian dynamics at multiple levels:
as observed, the free movement provisions of the Schengen Borders
Code result in new guarantees for Algerians in border areas, turning EU
courts into arbiters of entrenched conflicts between immigrants and
French law enforcement officials. The EU-Algerian Association
Agreement redesigns France's economic ties with its former colony by
regulating trade, investment and employees' residence rights;'4 0 the
French judicial opinion. The EU-led reform ended up energizing powerful lobbies from
pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors, which prompted resistance in the Assemblke Nationale
and slowed down the process of transposing the Directive into French law. Paradoxically,
Napoleon's civil code, intended to curb the superpower of the ancien rigine'sjudiciary, turned
into a judicial bulwark of resistance against legislative pressure.
138.

PAUL A. SLVERSTEIN, ALGERIA INFRANCE: TRANSPOLITICS, RACE, AND NATION 238

(2004) ("[T]he French presence in Algeria has been replaced by an Algerian presence in France
.... In the context of a newly unified Europe, Algerian transpolitics calls into direct question the
cultural makeup of French nationality and citizenship, the particularist and universalist
dimensions of the French nation-state as a political form.").
139. See Eleonore Kofnan, Madalina Rogoz & Florence Lvy, New Orientations for
Democracy in Eur., FamilyMigrdion Policies rn France,INT'L CTR. FOR MIGRATION Pol'Y DEV.
8-9, 12-13, 18, 26 (2010), http://research.icmpd.org/fileadmin/Research-Website/Projectmaterial/
NODE/FRPolicy_Report formatted7May.pdf.
140. The EU-Algeria Association Agreement was signed in 2002 and entered into force on
September 1, 2005. Council Decision 2005/690/EC, Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing
an Association Between the European Community and Its Member States, of the One Part, and
the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the Other Part, 2005 O.J. (L 265) 1, availableat
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.dp?uri=CELEX:32005D0690:EN:NOT.
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pressure on France to absorb workers from the rest of Europe, made
repeatedly clear by the ECJ in the context of maritime crews, alters the
socioeconomic status of North African labor.'41 One of the upshots of a
one-semester full immersion into the technicalities of EU law is the
ability to navigate Mediterranean geopolitics with acute awareness of
pressure points, real tools for advocacy, and solid analytics.
IX. CONCLUSION

The vagaries of the EU as a player on the world scene, the
transatlantic convergence of geopolitical visions, variations in trade
volume, or shifts in employment trends bear no relation to the
pedagogical value of EU law in the J.D. curriculum. By the same token,
the usefulness of EU law as an analytical base for scholarly endeavors
does not depend on the functional equivalence of federalism's legal
categories or on the compatibility of regulatory strategies, adopted on the
two sides of the Atlantic. The legal order realized through sixty years of
integration efforts is, per se, a worthy object of investigation in U.S. legal
academia. The foregoing discussion has attempted to highlight what one
is not to expect out of EU law studies, and to identify, by contrast, the
real payoffs. What follows is a closing synthesis.
Tushnet's taxonomy of comparative methodologies, already invoked
in these pages, comes in handy again to summarize what EU law is or is
not about. EU law's attractiveness as a comprehensive field of inquiry
does not depend on its being a bricoleur's paradise with its rich
experimentation in just about every matter of legal interest. Bricolage is,
by definition, content with details and indifferent to system-wide
investigations.142 It can therefore survive among U.S. legal scholars even
without painstaking efforts to understand the full dynamics of the
system. Neither does the relevance of the subject lie in further
functionalist studies. Functionalist U.S.-EU comparisons held promise in
the 1990s, but they seem to have run out of steam, or at least to have
picked and consumed all the low-hanging fruit. In its typical
applications, functionalism is aseptic and therefore dissatisfying when
141. Case 167/73, Comm'n v. French Republic (French Seamen), 1974 E.C.R. 361, 367.
The case concerned a 1926 provision (article 3(2) of the Code du Travail Maritime) requiring that
a high percentage of crew members aboard French vessels be French nationals. That piece of
French legislation was part of a historical attempt to stem the in-flow of North African labor in
the early twentieth century. France argued before the court that the decree was not in fact applied
to keep out of France other EU workers, and that the decree did not imply infringement of EU
law. The E.C.J. nonetheless found the decree incompatible with the principle of free movement of
workers. Id.
142. Tushnet, supm note 12, at 1228-29.
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rules are embedded in notoriously contested visions of post-national
democracy.'43
Expressivism, a third typology of comparative method in Tushnet's
taxonomy, might still be an appropriate strategy for U.S.-based EU law
specialists.'" Expressivists aim at identifying the particular values
embraced and promoted by other legal systems in order to compare and
contrast them with the sociocultural norms embodied in U.S. law.'45
Indeed, the EU strives to define its own values by means of charters,
judicial pronouncements, and particular interpretations of the law/politics
divide. The ECJ, in particular, has translated hot political debates into
justiciable questions 46 and contributed to transforming the status of rights
discourse in Member States' legal culture. 4 7 Such changes, for better or
worse, represent fundamental steps in the ongoing globalization of legal
consciousness, which is rightly emerging as a subject of jurisprudential
investigations in American academia. 4 3 Expressivism in "tempered"
form,'49 directed not at identifying the transcendental values voiced by
foreign systems' legal rules, but rather at uncovering the contestations,
power struggles, and compromises that produce such rules'o is essential
to the epistemology of globalization and finds valuable research material
in EU law.
143. A notable and drastic methodological variation, aptly named "textured functionalism,"
may rejuvenate the genre of functionalist studies and can certainly yield great scholarship. Anna
di Robilant, Abuse ofRights: The ContihentalDrug and the Common Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
687, 695 (2010).
144. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 1270 & n.214 (explaining the nature of expressivism and
referring to Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions,59 U. CHI. L. REV
519, 524 (1992), who posits that rights as construed by a given legal system "are legal
manifestations of divergent, and deeply rooted, cultural attitudes toward the state and its
functions").
145. See, eg., Mattias Kumm, Why Europeans Will Not Embrace Constitutional
Patriotism,6 INT'LJ. CONsT. L. 117, 134-36 (2008).
146. See, eg., Case C-420/07, Apostolides v. Orams, 2009 E.C.R. 1-3571, para. 62
(holding that a judgment concerning property in Northern Cyprus could be enforced in British
courts); Case C-386/08, Firma Brita GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, 2010 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 63, paras. 55, 58, 74.1 (Feb. 25, 2010) (holding that products originating from the
West Bank do not qualify for preferential customs treatment under the EU-Israel trade
agreement).
147. MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATIONS:
REVOLUTION INTHE COURTS OF EUROPE 62 (2009).
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148. See Kennedy, supra note 117, at 71; see also Ronald J. Daniels, Michael J.Trebilcock
& Lindsey D. Carson, The Legacy ofEmpire: The Common Law Inheritanceand Commitments
to Legalityin FormerBitish Colonies, 59 AM. J.COMP. L. 111, 114-15 (2011).
149. Tushnet, supm note 12, at 1279.
150. See, e.g., Grdinne de Bfirca, The RoadNot Taken: The EUasa GlobalHuman Rights
Actor, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 649 (2011); Fernanda Nicola, Thdinsatlanticisms: Constitutional
Asyrnmetry and Selective Reception of US Law and Economics in the FormationofEuropean
PrivateLaw, 16 CARDOZO J.INT'L & COMe. L. 87, 88-89, 139-41, 144 (2008).

2011]1

EULA WIN US. LEGAL ACADEMIA

201

However, the highest merit of comprehensive EU law inquiry lies
beyond the list of traditional comparative law methodologies and is
perhaps inherently orthogonal to comparative inquiries. If one sets aside
the traditional focus on differences and convergences between
territorially defined legal systems, what remains on the table of the EU
law specialist is an advanced experiment in globalization. The task,
utterly pragmatic and yet theoretically appealing, is to look at the
Brussels-centered legal changes of the past six decades as a project of
regional integration that has gone further than any other on the planet.
The EU has, partially but effectively, taken adjudication, policymaking,
and democracy outside of the nation-state. And it has done so thanks to
the promise of peace and prosperity that every single project of economic
liberalization carries within itself and boasts as political justification.
There is no better place than Europe to test the limits of that promise.
Ricardo's blanket does bring warmth to some corners of the world, but it
always proves too short and can only be pulled in so many directions."'
Alone, it never suffices.'52 It gets bunched up and wrinkled, and it may
cover what should rather stay stark.
The distributive impact of European legal integration, the reach of
the blanket and its shortcomings, its internal dynamics, and its
externalities, are all proper objects of study for legal scholars interested
in economic integration through law. The EU continues to experiment
with cross-border wealth reallocation by means of markets, subsidies,
and industrial and agricultural policies. It is a heavily legalized attempt
at economic development, with many a lesson for those involved in
overarching projects of global governance and growing evidence of both
success and failure. Laboring through the daunting maze of structures,
doctrines, and techniques of EU law is the only pathway towards this
treasure of experience.
I have no doubt that other disciplines, and in particular other areas
of foreign, comparative, or international law, can perform functions as
important as those of the classical EU law course. But the bar is high.
Should EU law disappear from the J.D. curriculum, it would leave a
legacy of high returns.

151. Damjan Kukovec, Whose Social Europe.' The Laval/lVikng Judgments and the
ProsperityGap, (Inst. for Global Law & Pol'y, Working Paper No. 3, 2011), http://www.harvard
iglp.org/wp-content/uploads/KukovecWhoseSocialEurope.pdf.
CONTRADICTIONS IN EU
152. See, eg., Cms RUMFORD, EUROPEAN COHESION?
INTEGRATION 94, 105-06 (2000) (noting that the free-trade regimes controlling the EU relations
with prospective members states, such as Turkey, "exacerbate divergent standards of living").

